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ABSTRACT
This paper is an analysis of the foreign policy of John
Quincy Adams from .1814 to 1829 in terms of the ideas of the
English philosopher John Locke.
Its main contention is that Locke influenced the think
ing of Adams as he formulated such policies9 whose purpose was
to bring about a world order which both suited American
national interests and satisfied a world-view greatly resem
bling that of Locke.
This world-view emphasized rationality, which wove a
fine balance between pragmatism and morality. It had as its
basis knowledge, perception, action, and belief in the effi
cacy of property, all being made to intellectually interact to
produce views marked by both fairness and a sense of histori
cal inevitability.
Adams applied these precepts throughout his career as
chief American negotiator of the Treaty of Ghent, Minister to
Great Britain, Secretary of State, and finally, President of
the United States.
He maintained these principles throughout, when dealing
with Britain over issues arising from the War of 1812, and
over Oregon, trade, and boundary disputes; when dealing with
Spain over American expansion and the Latin American repub
lics; when dealing with France, Russia, and Greece; and when
dealing with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.
The result was a series of policies which were consist
ent, yet pragmatic.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
A STUDY IN LOCKEAN SYNTHESIS

INTRODUCTION
There was a remarkable resemblance in the political and
philosophical thinking of two men who lived more than a century
apart. One, an Englishman, John Locke, lived from 1 6 3 2 to 1704 1
the other, an American, John Quincy Adams, lived from 1 7 6 7
1848. Locke was born in Wrington, Somerset, the son of an attor
ney, and was reared in a liberal Puritan environment. He atten
ded Oxford University, studied philosophy and medicine, and gra
duated in 1 6 5 6 . He then taught there, lecturing in Latin and
Greek. Later, he became associated with the great scientist,
Robert Boyle, and the great physician, Thomas Sydenham. In I6 6 7
he became associated with the Earl of Shaftesbury as physician
and diplomat, and in 1 6 8 3 had to flee to Holland because of
Shaftesbury's opposition to the Stuarts. After William of Orange
ascended the English throne in 1689, Locke returned, and in 1691
he was invited to reside at Oates, the home of Sir Francis and
Lady Masham. During this period, his two most important works,
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the Two Treatises
of Government, were published. He died in Oates.*
John Quincy Adams was born in Braintree, Massachusetts,
the son of a future President of the United States and founding
father of the Republic. He was educated both in Europe and at
Harvard College, and in 1790 he was admitted to the bar. In 1794
he was named Minister to the Netherlands, and later he served as
2

3
Minister to Prussia. In 1797 he married. He then served as a Fed
eralist United States Senator from 1 8 0 3 to 1 8 0 7 , breaking with
his party over Jefferson*s Embargo Act. Around this time he was
also Boylston Professor at Harvard. In 1809 he was named Minister
to Russia, and then he was chief American negotiator for the
Treaty of Ghent which ended the War of 1812. From 1 8 15 to 1817 he
was Minister to Great Britain. He then served as Secretary of
State under President James Monroe, and was subsequently elected
President of the United States by the House of Representatives in
a four-way race. From 1 8 3 0 until his death in l8 *f8 he was a United
States Congressman from Massachusetts. He died in Washington,
D.C. 2
Despite these national and temporal differences, the ideas
of the two men resembled one another greatly, particularly in
regard to government and the self. This is particularly evident in
the following concepts: (1) The state as a condition of moral
order; (2) The self as defined by consciousness; (3) The self as
thought and action; (^) The production of property as the definer
of self; and (5) Knowledge as a state of being certain.-^
Nowhere was the manifestation of these concepts more appar
ent than in Adams' career, first as a diplomat, and then as Pres
ident of the United States. This paper will outline the salient
conceptual influences on that career, and that career itself,
from 1 8 1 4 to 1829» when he was, in turn, chief American negotia
tor at Ghent, Minister to Great Britain, Secretary of State, and
President of the United States. During this time, he united a
life of contemplation and a life of action, being the quintessen

tial embodiment of Lockean action in his negotiations with the
Spanish over Florida; his formulation of the Monroe Doctrine; his
efforts at insuring that the United States would eventually
acquire the Oregon Territory; and his Presidential dealings with
various European and Latin American nations in regard to trade,
national sovereignty, and other matters. By his actions in these
areas, Adams synthesized the political, the philosophical, and
the pragmatic, and integrated them into his thinking about inter
national relationships.

In doing this, he developed and brought

to bear certain formative influences and realized a profound
individuality.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
The Rationalisn of Locke and Others As Influences
on John Quincy Adams
John Quincy Adams* ideas had a particular continuity with
those of his father, one of the founders of the American Republic,
and John Adams was an avid student of Locke, the philosopher whose
understanding of politics most influenced the thinking of the
Founding Fathers.^What is more, John Quincy Adams was part of an
intellectual environment which was permeated with the influence of
7
Locke, an influence from which both Federalists and anti-Federal-

8

ists drew guidance. For example, John Adams insisted that he and
his contemporaries were concerned with establishing a new and
purified type of political community which would be founded upon,
o
among other things, Christianity and Lockean precepts, and thus
10
his library contained volumes of Locke. Moreover, John Adams fur
ther insisted that the works of the great political philosophers,
such as Locke, Milton, Sidney, and Harrington would convince any
11

candid mind that a republican form of government was best.

Moreover, the mind of John Quincy Adams was very receptive,
as he early on took pride in the accomplishments of the American
Revolution and the Republic, and was very precocious, applying
himself to more serious matters than those which a very young man,
12
even in his day, would normally occupy himself with. As an indica
tion of this receptivity, one may cite the emphasis which he would
5

6
later place upon natural law. This can be traced back through his
father, and thence back to John Locke. However, his father was
not the only avenue of transmission of this influence. In the
larger environment, Locke's ideas were passed into the general
discourse in New England by way of pamphlets, newspapers, and
sermonst
Subsequently, John Quincy Adams accompanied his father to
Europe, where he cultivated a voracious appetite for books, which
he collected at least from 1779*^After his return to the United
States, he entered Harvard College, where he was further exposed
16

to Locke, having to endure a rigorous examination on the subject.

Its library also included Locke, as well as Algernon Sidney, Har
rington, and others whom its benefactor, Thomas Hollis, hoped
would imbue the Harvard students with a devotion to free consti17
tutional government.(It is interesting to note that Adams acknow
ledged that Harvard introduced him to all the prosperity that
ever befell him***
Later, John Quincy Adams' explicit references to Locke are
not numerous, but they are quite trenchant. The following are
examples of such references:
(1) Concerning Locke's denial of innate ideas: He appears to rea
son in such a manner that I am very much inclined to think
him right.19
(2) You have learnt from Mr. Locke, that all human ideas are
ultimately derived from one of two sources? either from
objects perceptible to the senses, or from the reflections of
our own minds upon such objects. It is equally clear that
language, the purpose of which is to communicate our ideas,
must be composed of words, the first drawn from ideas of sen
sation. 20
(3) In an address to his constituents in 18^2, Adams defended
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Locke and Sydney against Filmer and Hobbes, contending that
the consent of society needed to institute a valid govern
ment is part of the constitution of society.21
(4) When the question of the separation of powers was uppermost
in Congressional discussions, Adams went straight to Locke,
for he regarded him as the true originator of the theory.22
What is more, Locke was the prototypical rational man, and John
Quincy Adams placed particular importance upon the type of rea
son that deals with abstraction and theory as the source of an
understanding of life?^This was true in foreign affairs, as well
as in other endeavors.
However, there was more than the influence of Locke here.
-Adams was the product of the eighteenth century, and therefore
manifested many of the intellectual trends and traditions of
that century. What is more, he believed that the study of law,
supported by wide reading in history and politics, offered the
24
best training for public service and high office. Therefore, as
Secretary of State, he recommended Grotius, Vattel, and Montes2<
quieu as theoretical foundations of foreign policy. In addition,
he studied Burlamaqui at Harvard and had his works in his library. Adams was also a lifetime admirer of Cicero.
A study of such writers would tend to reinforce a world
view imbued with rationalism, order, and balance; one which com
bined the moral and the pragmatic. The following examples of
their thinking illustrate this:
(1) Grotius maintained that natural law was the basis for legis
lation for countries as well as for individuals, and he advocated
respect for life and the ownership of property.28
(2) Vattel stated that respect which others had for the rights of
domain and property constituted the security of our actual pos
sessions, and that there must be a balance of power in order to

8
control the authority of aggressive states.29
(3) Montesquieu examined monarchy, republic, and despotism, and
espoused a balance of powers in government and a separation of
authority. 3°
(4) Burlamaqui believed in natural law and its relationship to
God, human intellect, and innate moral responses, and considered
natural law to be the foundation of domestic and international
law. 31
(5) Cicero was the moral philosopher of Rome, and a practical
guide to the good life . 32
What is more, all his life, John Quincy Adams was also devoted
to the works of Aristotle, Virgil, Plutarch, Erasmus, Pope, Bolingbroke, Lord Kames, and Jefferson, which upheld the belief
that there was a moral order in the universe? that the community
of man should live within that order? and that government was
established with that end in mind?-^
The writings of these thinkers, therefore, provided a firm
conceptual reinforcement for Adams' rationalist tendencies.
These tendencies were reflected in his desire that his policies
be judged by their standards of propriety, accuracy in reflect
ing international conditions, and possible contribution to the
3k
nation's well-being.
The Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams
Counterpoised to these rationalist influences was one that
was pre-eminently irrationals Adams' Anglophobia. He revealed it
early on, as negative references to the British abound in his
letters and other sources. For example, in a letter of April 12,
1794 to his father, which was written from the Netherlands,
where he was American Minister, he stated that "the general dis

9
position of the French ruling powers has been constantly favora
ble to us, and the British government, acrimonious, jealous and
35
under the giuse of fair pretensions, deeply malignant.” It was a
fear and distrust which could perhaps only have arisen out of a
sense of betrayal, as Britain transgressed the orderly and
abstract reality of balance and social contract which Adams had
envisioned. There was, perhaps, even a feeling akin to that of a
child having discovered, at last, that his parents were not per
fect. It manifested itself in a concern about the special rela
tionship between Britain and rebellious governments, taking the
forms of both ideology and commerce, as well as power relation
ships as such?^
For example, again while he was American Minister to the
Netherlands, Adams wrote very disapprovingly of the British con
trol over the Dutch government, lamenting its unwillingness to
37
negotiate with France?'He even condemned the British national
38
character, considering them an "object of aversion.” He applau
ded any British setback, and he condemned the supposed British
efforts to aggrandize themselves^Therefore, he would gleefully
anticipate a decline in British power. Because of this, he
looked with favor upon the British war with Napoleon, believing
that a few more years of peace in America and war in Europe
would so bankrupt and exhaust Britain that all her possessions
in the New World would fall to the United States.
On a more theoretical level, Adams believed that the
dependence of the American colonies upon Great Britain was a
"dependence of parchments of proclamations unsanctioned by the

10
41
laws of nature, disavowed by the dictates of reason.” Again,
this transgressing of natural law was the theme of another
utterance* "Britain, inspired by the shibboleth,

’Rule Britan

nia! Britannia rule the waves!', foisted upon the world a jus
tice in maritime matters widely divergent from the requirements

42
of natural justice.”
His antipathy could even approach the concept of a Manichean dualism. For example, Adams stated, "Unconditional surren
der to British overlordship would be anathema” j or "The combined
purpose of all other commercial nations should be to counteract
this overwhelming power of Britain." Such feelings could reach
such a level of intensity that he sometimes invoked scriptural
44
injunction to show America's right in relation to Britain.
In short, the Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams was based
upon a combination of empirical, emotional, and theoretical fac
tors. One must understand this in analyzing his actions towards
Britain while he was a diplomat, Secretary of State, and Presi
dent of the United States.

THE DIPLOMAT AS A LOCKEAN ACTING PERSON
John Quincy Adams is considered perhaps the most accom
plished diplomat in American history. What is more, he had a
considerable talent for abstract theory and its practical applih,Z
cation to American nationalism.JHe therefore accomplished his
tasks by gathering multitudes of empirical data for use in gov
ernmental decisions, and then subjecting it to the most rigorous
46
analytical processes. With the ideas, or mixed modes, formulated
from this effort he produced courses of action involving deal
ings with Great Britain, France, Russia, Spain, and other coun
tries, both in regard to the continental expansion of the United
States, and in regard to the maintainance or establishment of
American rights in more non-contiguous areas such as Latin Amer
ica and the British West Indies. This integrated process
involved the choosing of ideas, and their subjection to a pro
cess of free variation which, according to Locke, are a series
of relations, of simple ideas conflated in different ways. The
fashioning of the mental structures which are the product of
this process is a function of consciousness, which is the pri
mary quantity which defines the self. Intimately related to this
is the Lockean concept of freedom as power, or the ability to
bring into significant effect the concepts arising from that
47
consciousness.1
The acting out of these concepts involved complex efforts
11

12
which were integrated by a conceptual model of the international
environment whieh was quite Lockean. It involved the concept of
moral order, which Adams first applied to the United States. He
regarded America as a unique social compact which had its gene
sis in the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, he regarded
the United States as the first nation in the world which derived
its principles from the laws of nature, and as a “moral person”
(an entity acting in conformance with those laws) in the family
of nations. He juxtaposed this unique compact, m

which men

lived in harmony with each other and exercised their rational
thinking abilities in order to maximize individual happiness,
with the relationships of nations to each other. This individual
happiness could only be possible within an environment of free
dom and individual initiative. In the international.arena, this
was the state of nature, in which nations lived according to
their own laws, and recognized no others. In such a situation
force would inevitably have to be used in order to protect human
freedoms. Because of this inevitable possibility, Adams believed
that a strong militia and navy were necessary for the protection
49
of the United States against aggression. Locke, too, realized
that men engaged in the social compact would not long be secure
in that interaction of relationships without external means of
assuring it. Therefore, in creating an environment of security
in which war would be unnecessary, he considered foreign policy
to be the ultimate determinant of the structure of society^°This
line of thinking reveals a degree of pragmatism which marked the
actions of both men.

13
Adams also discerned the basic importance of foreign
policy. To him, war would only be the last resort when the ideas
resulting from reasoned consideration could not go into effect.
Before such a calamitous occurrence, every reasonable man should
be aware that rational statesmen would abide by international
law, and that this awareness would be an important integrating
idea of the nature of society, and of the international order in
general. This belief was a guiding idea in John Quincy Adams'
diplomatic efforts. As a case-in-point concerning this belief,
there is an 1806 address, where Adams, as a United States
Senator, stated in Congress: "Ministers are the only instruments
by which war is averted when it approaches, or terminated, and
51
this consideration surrounds their sanctity." Similarly, there
is an 1823 letter of instruction to Benjamin Rush, United States
Minister to Great Britain: "The policy of the United States,
with reference to foreign nations, has always been founded upon
<2
the principle of natural law, peace with all mankind.
Nevertheless, seeking to achieve or maintain peace while
being concomitantly armed for war did represent something of a
moral dilemna which Adams must have found difficult to resolve.
One must explain this apparent contradiction in terms of the
richness of ideas which he had at his command due to his varie
gated background of education and experience, and how this was
intimately related to his personal freedom, or freedom of
action. According to Locke, the existence of the nature of
things circumscribes one's actions because it circumscribes
thoughts.^That is, the constituents of external reality, because

Ik
of their discrete and relatively rigid nature, are self-limited
in their capacity for interaction, both in situ, and in their
susceptibility to transformation by thought. What is more, a
nation-state such as the United States, being a "moral person",
must consist, as a person, of the combined consciousnesses of
all its citizens, deriving those consciousnesses from their
environment and institutionally and culturally integrating them
into a coherent structure called a nation, by a process of
mutual interaction over time. This coherent structure is pre
served over time, indeed, over the generations, by a collective
knowledge of values, events, and other culturally shared exper
iences congruent with what was immediately past, which was, in
turn, known to be related to what was immediately its precedent. Such a process of national delimiting also affected the
thinking of Adams in another way

his recognition of geographic

factors as the foundation of national interests and diplomatic
55
advantage. The state was therefore the basic unit of conceptual
homogeneity in the world.
It is thus not surprising that John Quincy Adams believed
that the individual owed the exercise of all his faculties to
56
the service of the nation-state. In effect, he wanted the United
States to be a closed system of the interaction of ideas, its
richness internally generated. He thought about this matter in
insular terms. A portion of his 1802 address to the Massachu
setts Charitable Fire Society is instructive: "The largest por
tion of this Continent is united under a social compact, which
makes its inhabitants equal fellow-citizens of one great and

15
57
growing empire." Because Adams possessed this rohust Americanism
and nationalism, but at the same time believed that "violence
and persuasion, being in their nature as opposite to each other,
58
as light and darkness, can never exist together", he wished to
preserve that conceptual input by diplomacy, for his own edifi
cation and, in turn, for the edification of others. The boundar
ies of the state must not be transgressed by war, and the col
lectively creative must not be destroyed. How conscious he was
of this collective can be illustrated in an 1810 quotation from
Boylston lectures at Harvard! "None of us liveth to himself, and
as we live to our families, by the intercourse of more intimate
society and mutual good offices, so we live to our country, and
to mankind in general, by the performance of those services, and
by the discharge of those labors which belong to the profession
59
we have chosen as the occupation of our lives." By this effort,
John Quincy Adams would realize his moral and intellectual,
potential by means of the exchange of ideas and perceptions with
other citizens of the nation-state.

In turn, the existence of

the nation-state would be continuously reinforced by the reaf
firmation of the consciousnesses of its constituent parts. As a
result of this, a vast increase in the richness of ideas would
ensue, thereby progressively contributing to the general wel
fare, or, in Adams' words, "the individual enjoyment of progres-

60
sive improvement and individual discovery". Self and state would
therefore be intimately associated in a free and fruitful relat
ionship.
The Lockean belief in the state as a moral person can thus

16
be equated with the person as a being defined by consciousness.
Both would have the right to defend themselves in order to main
tain their boundaries of individuality. Actions toward that end,
if tending towards the preservation of that moral person, would
be moral by implication, because such consequent action would
be a function of the exercise of reason used to protect one's
freedom. Locke was quite explicit about this: "The state of war
is a state of enmity and destruction . . .; it being reasonable
and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens
61
me with destruction." Likewise, Adams maintained: "For my part
I cannot imagine a possible state of the world for futurity in
which the United States shall not be a great naval and military
power . . . And as we have begun and made some progress in it
already, I doubt whether we shall ever have again so favorable
an opportunity for accomodating our permanent political system
62
to it as the present." This declamation was made within the con
text of the War of 1812, but no such interpretation can be
placed upon a statement of Adams' later years: Philosophically
speaking, I believe that war was not a corrupter, but rather a
purifier of the moral character of man, that peace was the
63
period of corruption to the human race." Towards the end of his
life, it seems that he had evolved an extreme manifestation of
certain previous tendencies of his thinking. The United States
has here become more than merely a moral person; it has become
an empyrean entity forever beyond the corrupting influence of
the amoral European states, or despotisms. The individual col
lective consciousness has become, in effect, solipsistic, unin

17
volved with the connotative differences of moral definition
which are often a function of cultural differences.
However, many years before this aberration, Adams could
express an attitude which could only be interpreted as a feeling
that it would be considered a moral act for a nation to either
live in peace with its coeval fellow nations, or to engage in
war with one or another of them in order to protect the indivi
duality of the collective national moral person. An 1816 letter
to his father is illustrative of this belief:
Whatever may be the natural and necessary propensities of
mankind to war, my special duty at present is to preach
peace . . . It was a war from which, if the account of
disgrace and glory were fairly balanced, we should have
something, but not much to boast of. May we do better the
next timet and that we may do better, let us not be hasty
to enter upon the contest. At the same time it is not
'ignoble ease and peaceful sloth* that I would counsel.
An efficient revenue and a growing navy, these are the
pillars of my peace. 64
The apparent dichotomy of feeling is evident here, in this case
involving Adams' feelings concerning Great Britain and its then
recently concluded war with the United States. Anxious for the
security of his country because he was an integral part of the
interaction of ideas that defined its collective nature, by
striving to maintain its profile of individuality, he strove to
maintain his.
It may be said that xenophobia would be a logical develop
ment of such feelings, and so it w a s ^ I t was an antipathy which
Adams could express with crushing philosophical puissance. A
passage from his 1821 address commemorating the signing of the
Declaration of Independence is a good example of this Anglopho
bia: ’’The connexion between the British government and the Amer-

18
ican people was unnatural? and it was in the moral order that it
66
should be dissolved.” This was a truly Lockean utterance, assum
ing, as it did, the self-evidence of the moral order to men of
reason, and the logical acts inevitably flowing from those rea
soned perceptions.
The natural manifestations of such moral order, the defi
nitive dissolution of the colonial bonds connecting Great Bri
tain and the United States (and therefore the erection of a sta
ble, mixed mode idea structure, free of empirical perturbations),
occurred with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on December 14,
67
l8l4, with the formal ratification exchange on January 8, 1815*
Thus ended the War of 1812, "The Second American War for Inde
pendence” , and the man who was in charge of the American side of
the negotiations which brought this about was John Quincy Adams.
However, he was notably assisted by Henry Clay and Albert Galla68
tin. At Ghent, Adams could, in effect, attempt to realize his
Lockean self, for as long as America remained subservient to
Britain in any way (such as by continuing to acquiesce in the
British impressment of American seamen), the structure of ideas
defining the conscious national self would remain subservient to
the idea of Britain as the power to invoke idea. The idea would
exist autonomously, with virtually infinite potential to frus
trate. It would he up to m a n ’s reason to forego this quandary
with solutions, and this reasoning process would be eminently
Lockean.

Its basis would lie in the belief that all ideas are

extracted from experience by reflection and sensation, and then,
69
in turn, projected beyond experience. Since they exist as mental

19
structures separate from the person from whom they are derived,
or to whom they will be assimilated, it is up to man's reason to
perceive the agreement or disagreement between those ideas in
70
order to produce knowledge! Again, according to Locke, knowledge
bears the same relationship to an individual as his behavior,
71
character, or properties! Therefore, one's knowledge helps to
define one's individuality. Britain, by being hostile to its
former colonies, with its impressment of American seamen, denial
of the entrance of American merchant vessels into the harbors of
its West Indies colonies, continued disputes concerning the bor
der between the United States and Canada, disputes concerning
fishing rights off the Canadian coast, and other exactions, pro
duced the empirical basis for the forced elimination of certain
courses of action by the Americans. This was because the per
ceived field of action believed by the Americans to be a legiti
mate potential area of opportunity and national growth, was
already occupied by adamantine British power. Locke maintained
that action is the power to modify a substance from without, and
the power to bring into view for consideration that which is
72
extrinsic, and that action depends on will! Therefore, the per
ception of Britain as powerful and superior would preclude the
free exercise of will due to the elimination of many of the ele
ments of choice. If man does not act in accordance with his
will, then his actions and the products of those actions cannot
be considered his own. And, since his actions and products are
an extension of himself, an alienation from one's own environ
ment of ideas can occur, resulting in a species of identity

20
denial. This consideration is particularly important in Locke,
because he denied the legitimacy of defining personal identity
73
as a merely physical persistence over time. Thus, consciousness
and knowledge must be considered particularly important as the
definers of such identity. At the level of the nation-state,
this British suborning of will could result in the undermining
of the national sense of selfhood, with the resultant paralysis
of the ability to fashion by that will the structures of ideas
dealing with national growth, a sense of national identity, or
the ability to alter the environment for a peculiarly national
purpose.
John Quincy Adams was deeply aware of this danger, and he
therefore strove to effect the realization of American national
identity. In bringing this about, it can be said that he ren
dered an inestimable service to the United States by his uncomjL
promising stand for American rights at Ghent: Always guided by
the idea expressed in his Newburyport Oration: "In the struggle
of resistance against a common oppressor, coalesced spontane75
ously into one people by moral centripetal impulse", he consis
tently rejected the British contention that the War of 1812
annulled all previously existing treaties between the two
nations?^
He maintained this and similar positions despite being
caught between British arrogance, on the one hand, and his dis
like for certain other members of the American delegation, on
the other. Henry Clay drew Adams’ especial ire because he consi
dered him a man who was more interested that the war should con
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tinue than that it should end, and perhaps a reminder to Adams
that he was also caught in the Lockean quandary of both neces
sary peace and necessary war?^The idea of America, held in com
mon as a mixed mode, had to be preserved by war, as a defense
against harm coming from foreigri quarters; yet, in order for the
moral person of America to prosper and grow, the production of
ideas within an ordered background had to be effected— a back
ground which could only be brought about by peace.
Adams perceived the nature of this conceptual process. For
example, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* he stated:
"The powers of the imagination are not confined to the reminis
cence of ideas which have been admitted to the mind through the
medium of the senses? they extend also to the combination of
such ideas into forms different from any of the combinations of
nature. It is the union of these two powers in the faculties of
78
man, which opens a new creation to the mind." With that state
ment he expressed the Lockean concept of the two sources of
79
ideas, and it would obviously be an intellectual synthesis of
this type, in international affairs, which could follow a peace
with Britain. However, the existence of an enemy nation would
preclude the free interaction of these two types of ideas, as
minds would be constantly drawn back to the overwhelming entity
threatening the very dissolution of the conceptual underpinnings
of the state. This vectoring of American minds towards a single
predicative object would obviously preclude the interactive
realization of intellectual potential, which Adams— and Locke—
envisioned.
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Therefore, at Ghent, Adams would strive assiduously for a
world in which there would not only be an absence of conflict,
but also the perception of the absence of the potential for con
flict. Britain he considered the chief barrier to that realiza
tion. In his 1808 letter to Harrison Gray Otis, he stated* "The
great obstacle which has always interfered in the adjustment of
our differences with Britain, has been that she would not acqui
esce in the only principle upon which fair negotiations between
independent nations can be conducted, the principle of recipro-
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city." In other words, John Quincy Adams wished that Great Brit
ain would enter into the commonality of the "state of nature",
a condition in which all sovereign states were equal, and had
the equal right to be free from the domination of any other
Q «|

nation. This was congruent with the thinking of Locke, not only
on the level of the nation-state, but also as it applies to the
individual.
As an illustration of this, Adams always insisted upon
maintaining personal dignity, not only as a representative of
the United States, but also as a free individual who acted to
effect the state of nature on a personal scale by seeking to
restrain men from invading the rights of others. To this end, he
always sought to moderate the behavior of the British negotiapp
tors Goulbum, Lord Gambier, and the others. However, he
believed that his efforts were in vain. A single comment from
his diary suffices* "The tone of all the British notes is arro
gant, overbearing, and offensive. The tone of ours is neither so
bold nor so spirited as I think it should be. It is too much on
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the defensive, and too excessive in the caution to say nothing
83
irritating . . • But in this opinion I am alone." He thus main
tained an adamantine individuality through all the sparring and
emotional counterpoint, and through all the issues, such as
whether the Indians should be treated as sovereign nations, or
whether the United States was planning to conquer Canada.
Nevertheless, the treaty ending the War of 1812 was
signed. But it left many disputes between Britain and the
United States unresolved. They included the fixing of the boun
daries between the United States and Canada; fishing rights on
the Grand Banks, off the Canadian Atlantic coast; the impress
ment of American seamen; the lack of British respect for Ameri
can neutral rights; the right of blockade at sea; and the ques
tion of whether Britain and the United States had the right to
maintain naval forces on the Great Lakes?^In short, the treaty
merely imposed a status quo ante bellunu with no improvement of
that condition. Adams would have much to say about these ques
tions in later years, not only in regard to the maintainance of
the equality of nations, but also, by implication, in regard to
property rights in their broadest, Lockean sense— as the pro
tection of the means of sustenance.
After the conclusion of the negotiations at Ghent, Adams
was named Minister to Great Britain by President James Madison.
In this office he initiated conversations which were to result
in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1 8 1 8 , whereby the boundary
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between Canada and the United States was demilitarized. He also
constantly brought up all the other questions left outstanding

2k
by the Treaty of Ghent. In Lockean terms, such agreements were
simply conditional accords in which certain retrenchments in
the compass of action were permitted in order to allow a compa87
rative freedom of action to both parties in separate spheres.
Indeed, what would be involved would often be actual physical
retreat, in this case involving military forces so as to pre
vent violent confrontations. To Locke, therefore, freedom was
g
the ability to act or not to act, according to choice, or will.
Additionally, according to the Lockean concept of ideas being
89
derived from experience, if physical freedom is circumscribed,
the capacity of the individual to synthesize ideas from his
environment is also circumscribed. Therefore, with Adams again,
/

there would be a compelling necessity to enter into treaty
agreements with Britain, on behalf of the United States, due to
a congruence of Lockean political, i.e., pragmatic, and philo
sophical determinants.
In 1 8 1 7 Adams was named Secretary of State by President
James Monroe. He brought to this office a sense of the highest
moral standards. For example, as a United States Senator in
1 8 0 6 , he maintained that "A foreign minister does not represent

the person of his master, but only him in his affairs, and is
90
therefore not entitled to his immunities." He also brought to
this position a belief acquired from his European experiences
that neutrality was essential for the continuance of American
Constitutional union, and even independence, at that time in
91
American history.
With these profound beliefs as part of his world-view,
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Adams could effect a personal Lockean synthesis of American
foreign policy, basing it upon the concept of a world in which
all nations engaged in reciprocal relationships as equals, none
under the domination of another. It would be the world as the
state of nature, but also the world as a function of enlight
ened pragmatism. To render this idea a reality, he would engage
himself very actively; first, by gathering empirical data as
input for use in governmental decisions; secondly, by applying
his great talent for diplomacy, accompanied by his native
training and interest in this type of endeavor, to prescient
analyses of both the internal and the diplomatic dynamics of
European and other states. Into this alchemy of ideas and
actions he also brought his wide experience and his extensive
92
background in academics, languages, and law. Here, one can
again notice the Lockean interaction between ideas, extrinsically generated, and ideas as a result of reflection upon the
properties and characteristics of the first type. This interac93
tion produces understanding, which could range, in Adams* case,
from a discerning of British motives in their attempt to hold
onto the Oregon Territory, to an anticipation of the policies
which the European leaders were likely to pursue in regard to
9k
one another; And, he would cast wide this net of meticulous
action. For example, his diplomatic instructions to American
foreign service officers concerning their duties are consid
ered to be masterful. Illustrative of this is an 1818 instruc
tion to George Washington Campbell, American consul in Russia,
in which Adams takes time to delineate that Campbell's duties

26
are intimately related to the history of United States trade
relations with Russia; the trading practices of the Russian
merchants; the possible role of Russia as a naval power; and
possible Anglo-Russian conflict in the Northwest9 all in copiQC
ous detail. Such meticulousness and richness of ideas truly
represented the Lockean effectuation of freedom. He could act,
and he knew his actions would have effect.
He would now apply his mind, broadcast, in an environment
where will and action could often follow each other in order to
produce change or interaction. This change could be defined by
three concepts of Lockes (1) The self as thought and action;
(2) The vital necessity for producing property; and (3) Know96
ledge as the state of being certain.
In order to determine how Adams produced this synthesis
in his thoughts and actions between the philosophical and the
pragmatic, there will now be an analysis of one of his most
important acts as Secretary of State— the formulation of the
Monroe Doctrine. He began to formulate it as early as January,
1819, when he advocated that the United States should recognize
the new Latin American governments, and that Great Britain
97
should do likewise in concert with the Americans. By this act,
which warned against European interference in Latin American
affairs (and also sought to bind Great Britain by principle so
that it would not acquire the former Spanish colonies for
98
itself), these new republics, recently having forcefully
severed their ties with Spain, and unused to governing them
selves in a responsible manner, could be brought into the con-
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cert of nations.
However, the evolution of the Doctrine from its first
formulation to when it was decided upon by President Monroe in
1823 was complex, refecting its varying antecedents in thought
and action. Its first explicit statement came in a conversation
between Adams and Baron Tuyl, Russian Minister to the United
States, in which Adams stated that he expected that Russia
would not encroach upon the North American continent, and in
return, that the United States would not interfere in European
99
affairs. He would utilize this principle of the mutual exclu
sion of national sovereignty many times in carrying out his
plans for America’s destiny.
These plans required a seamless definition of the self as
thought and action, or the causing to carry through of a policy
as a direct result of intellect and will.

In defining the self

as thought and action, Locke considered action to be an active
power which effectuates the passive power of thought by produc
ing an effect as the active manifestation of that thought which
100
originated as an impression from something extrinsic. This
extrinsic impression is refashioned by the mind into an entity
which is paradigmatically derived from what produced it, but
bears little resemblance to that. Richness of thought suid rich
ness of action interact in a type of free variation of ideas
and perceptions to lend the thinker a greater and greater
degree of self-definition as will, the whole determining the
degree of freedom one possesses. One can see how this freedom
of action, in Adams' case, in interaction with a freedom of
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thought derived from the multitude of ways and applications of
the paradigmatic concept of "Britain as the arrogant aggressor",
lent him an individual profile--and will--in driving through his
individual concept of the Monroe Doctrine*
An impetus for that anger which Adams possessed in regard
to the British was provided by a confidential letter from George
Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, to Richard Rush, the
American Minister to Great Britain, which suggested that a joint
Anglo-American declaration be promulgated, declaring that the
Spanish recovery of its South American colonies which had suc101
cessfully revolted was hopeless. President Monroe apparently
favored the proposal, but Adams consistently opposed any joint
102
action with the British. He had to take into account many fac
tors which determined his actions towards Spain, and European
intervention would have the potential for bringing forth a sys
tematic matrix of actions. For example, the reactionary Holy
Alliance created the spectre of European intervention in Latin
103
America in the interest of reimposing the status q u o ante. At
same time, the United States was in a delicate relationship
with Spain over the question of a potential American conquest
104
of its non-revolting American colony, Cuba. Moreover, Adams was
afraid that should the United States agree to the British pro
posal for joint intervention, it would find itself at a dis
tinct disadvantage because of the vastly greater British mili
tary power. Indeed, such an intervention would probably result
in the former Spanish colonies falling to Britain, or the
United States, nolens volens. supporting a closed system of Bri-
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tish commercial imperialism in regard to Latin America.
Again, one can see how fearful Adams was that America
would he subordinated to the exigencies of British power and
British policy. This imperial control would obviously be detri
mental to the development of a mature sense of freedom among
the people of the new Latin American republics. Being politic
ally immature, these people lacked the actuality (as opposed to
the potentiality) of reason in their dealings with the outside
world— and with each other. According to Locke, human freedom
is based upon man's reason, by which he can interpret the sen
sory information from which the richness of ideas arises, and
discover the law of nature. This law of nature expresses the
obligation through which this freedom receives its intention
106
and meaning. Furthermore, the people of Latin America, untu
tored in the blessings of freedom and reason, would be awash in
107
sin, for the ultimate source of man's reason is God. Thus, the
denial of reason would take on a moral dimension, and in regard
to these emerging nations, there can be no doubt that Adams
considered their independence from this perspective. In writing
of the new South American republic of Colombia, for example, he
expressed these views:
The republic of Colombia, if permanently organized to
embrace the whole territory which it now claims, and
blessed with a government effectually protective of the
rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become
hereafter one of the mightiest nations of the earth.
He goes on to describe Colombia's location, resources, and
other features. Then:
But it is the man placed in a Paradise like this that
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nature with her loudest voice exclaims, 'God to thee has
done his part— do thine* . . . . If the natural advanta
ges bestowed upon the Columbian territory were to be
improved by its inhabitants only for purposes of empire
that which nature has bestowed as a blessing upon them
would in its consequences prove a curse inflicted upon
the rest of mankind#108
However, in addition to these proximately moral views,
Adams has expressed another Lockean concept. In this statement,
the beneficient use of the environment takes on a teleological
import, as he believed that the progressive improvement in the
109
condition of man was the purpose of a superintending God. And,
intimately related to this view was the Lockean concept of prop
erty. By property, Locke meant life, liberty, and property, in
that property is what man extracts from nature by his own
110
efforts and fashions for his own sustenance* life and liberty
being the inevitable result. In short, it is the material result
of the wfree variation” in which one engages with ideas as the
definer of self. It is thus another delineator of self, of free
dom and happiness in the individual, and of the will of God. It
is the radius of freedom extracted from sin often reluctant envi
ronment. This linking of reason with morality, and, in turn,
with the obligation to beneficially improve the environment, was
a Lockean synthesis which marked John Quincy Adams' Latin Ameri
can policies. Two further examples of his thinking in this area
are illustrative. The first consists of a portion of a letter to
Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy: "But while the Government
of the United States have thus taken every occasion offered them
in the course of events to manifest their good wishes in favor
of the South Americans, they have never lost sight of the obli
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gations incumbent on them, as avowedly neutral to the contest
111
between them and Spain.” The second consists of a portion of a
letter to Joaquin de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United
States; "It is the mere acknowledgement of existing facts, with
the view to the regular establishment with the Nations newly
formed, of those relations, political and commercial, which it
is the moral obligation of civilized and Christian Nations to
112
entertain reciprocally with one another." Moralism and pragmat
ism were seamlessly interweaved.
The question must now arise as to how such thinking could
be applied to the governments of these nations themselves.
According to Locke, in the formation of the state, the indivi
dual entered into an agreement not only to obey the government,
but also to submit his property to the jurisdiction of that
government. But Locke stated thst governments exist as agents
113
to secure property. Therefore, governments exist not so much to
impose restraint as to facilitate the self-individualization of
the person as one who is defined, and whose freedom is defined
by, the ability to accumulate property. By taking upon them
selves the function of guarantor of property, governments thus
obligated themselves to act in a reasonable manner, and thus in
accordance with God's will, in order to guarantee man's intel
lectual freedom, the power to acquire and manipulate ideas.
Paraphrasing Locke: "If man is the creature of God, he is the
property of God. But, he can only be the property of God if God
t
owns his body, his work, and his product, which are an extenlll*
sion of the person." The right to property would therefore be
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of divine origin. Moreover, because each person is a product of
God, he must preserve himself in order that such work not be
defiled. Thus, Locke called for the protection of property as
a moral imperative— property as what inheres to the individual
and, by implication, property as it comprises the totality of
the state. This state Locke defined as the exclusive right to a
115
particular part of the earth's surface. Hence, from the previ
ous argument it may be concluded that only states which protect
property are moral states, and only moral states have a right
to exist.
From this it may be stated that as far as Adams was con
cerned, in order for the moral imperative to have effect, the
sanctum sanctorum of property, protected by the state, should
not be interfered with, and the protection of property and the
preservation of territorial integrity were synonymous. The
Latin American states should be left alone. He strove to put
this policy into effect. Again, illustrative of this was his
strenuous objection to amending a dispatch to Richard Rush con
cerning the official reply to Foreign Secretary Canning's pro
posal of joint Anglo-American action to protect the new Latin
American republics. The amendment appeared to admit that the
United States would not object to an arrangement by which spe
cial favors, or even a restoration of authority, could possibly
be conceded to Spain. Such interference could not be allowed.
116
The amendments were rejected.
With the free variation of thought and the moral impera
tive in regard to allowing the Latin American nations to deve-
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lop unhindered depicted, it would now be appropriate to examine
the structure of this process in Lockean terms, and to provide
further examples of it concerning the Monroe Doctrine. The free
variation in Adams* manipulation of ideas, in this instance,
proceeding from a firm basis in the acute perception of rela
tionships, was redolent of the Lockean belief in intuitive know
ledge as the perception of the agreement or the disagreement of
two ideas, immediately by themselves, without the intervention
117
of any other ideas. Such a manipulation of ideas would consist
primarily of the analysis of the consequences of those intui
tively perceived relationships. To Adams, one of these relation
ships consisted of his profound understanding of Europe and its
118
connection with the New World. At the same time, it may be said
that this very intuitive facility was the result of profound
study, experience, and analysis, the product of assiduous
effort, so much so that the result would be an instant grasp of
the paradigmatic. Indeed, he provided himself with the richness
of ideas to make this possible at an early age because of his
varied and comprehensive education. Therefore, at each stage of
his analytical thinking, Adams conformed to Locke*s belief that
each part of a process of reasoning must be supported by intui119
tive evidence.
This acquisition of knowledge as the state of being cer
tain led him to a degree of belief in values which could almost
be accounted religious dogma. A manifestation of these beliefs
was his diplomatic correspondence, which was, like most of his
writings, based upon profound knowledge and careful study. As a
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case-in-point concerning the Monroe Doctrine, there is his 1823
letter to Richard C. Anderson, American Minister to Spain, in
which an intuitive grasp of the inevitability of human progress
is combined with an intuitive belief in the efficacy of princi
ple as the guiding force in international relations. A few pas
sages are illustrative of Adams* thinking as he applies princi
ple to an empirical situation: "The European alliance of emper
ors and kings have assumed as the foundation of human society
the doctrine of unalienable allegiance. Our doctrine is founded
upon the principle of unalienable right." Or: "Civil, politi
cal, commercial and religious liberty are but various modifica
tions of one great principle founded in the unalienable rights
of human nature, and before the universal application of which
the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere
120
has fallen, and is crumbling into dust." One can discern here
the manner in which the activating idea of principle formed the
unifying force of the ideas of Adams, lending them a paradigma
tic mixed mode integration as knowledge. The process was dis
tinctly redolent of Locke, and produced a distinct force of
action. The Monroe Doctrine— largely the handiwork of Adams,
especially the non-colonization paragraph--was enunciated by
121
President Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823*

But there were other ideas of Locke which John Quincy
Adams strove to apply. One of these was the question of order
in relation to God's will. It was a question which the acquisi
tion of Florida brought out for him, because he regarded the
signing of the treaty with Spain which brought this about to be
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the most important act of his lifet a working out of divine pro122
vidence. It represented for him the transfer of sovereignty from
the chaotic will of a monarch to the ordered will of a govern
ment which was a social compact governed by reasons an ordering
of reality according to the will of Godf for the happiness of
man. Concomitantly, it is not surprising that he believed that
Europe was incorrigibly corrupt, and an adherent of outmoded
political practices, and that he was concerned for moral order
123
and the community of men. The bringing into being of this moral
order resided in treaties, the use of military forces, and other
means. The treaty with Spain was signed on February 22, 1819,
after long and acrimonious negotiations between Adams and Don
Luis de Onis. It not only ceded Florida to the United States, it
defined the national borders in an exceedingly advantageous way
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by favorably rectifying the limits of the Ladsiana Purchase. It
also provided for the American government to assume all the
claims of its citizens against Spain up to $5 million, and to
125
renounce all claims to Texas. With these measures, the social
compact would now hold sway over an unprecedentedly wider area—
an area in which reason and the will of God would prevail.
Instead of the imbalance of human forces manifested in greed and
malevolence, and institutionalized in monarchical rule, there
would be order based upon rational choices, and justice in
treatment and in the allocation of resources. There would be
governmental and behavioral stability, for, as Locke maintained,
126
justice and truth are the common ties of society.
In order to understand precisely why and how Adams

36
acquired Florida for the United States, his actions must be
explained in terms of these precepts. In 1818, because of the
depredations of Indian raiders from Florida upon adjacent Amer
ican territory and populations, General Andrew Jackson was dis
patched with a military force to pursue them across the border.
He occupied Pensacola, executed Arbuthnot and Armbrister, Brit
ish subjects who had assisted the Indians, and performed other
127
military acts to restore order. To Don Luis de Onis, Adams
defended Jackson's actions and urged Spain to honor the 1795
treaty with the United States in which Spain pledged to res128
train the Indians in its colonies. At once, one can see that
the question of order arises. There was concern on the part of
Adams for both the restoration of the status

quo

ante, in which

at least the simulacrum of order prevailed, though it may not
have been inherent, and the sanctity of treaties as freelycontracted obligations. In the latter instance, if the condi
tions under which the treaty was contracted had changed, the
United States, as one of the freely-contracting parties, would
have had the right to renounce that treaty and to act to defend
129
itself in the interest of self-preservation. Adams was quite
explicit about this. In an 1818 letter to George William Erving
he definitively condemned the Indians as savages, and declared
that it was the duty of the United States government to protect
130
its people and their property. Here, in effect, he sought to
utilize the power of the United States to bring about a condi
tion of order in which men would not give way to their passions
and act in a manner contrary to the law of nature. To Locke,
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this law of nature was tantamount to the law of God, which is

131

discerned by human reason* And, it is by reason that men deter132
mine precisely what their own best interests are. This process
of determination is a function of the creative manipulation and
interchange of ideas within a social environment. With such an
arrangement determining judgements of value, voluntary associa
tion, and hence, an ordered psychological environment free of
the negative emotional perturbations and inconsistencies of
value characterizing non-social existence, must be implied.
Therefore, to Locke, without the law of nature— and of God, and
without the contractual consent of the members of that society,
no social organization could be acceptable. Indeed, to Locke,
the idea of consent was central to the very constitution of
133
society. John Quincy Adams held similar views. He believed that
the first moral element of civil government was sympathy among
13^
the members who comprise it. There is thus brought about a
state of order, both in terms of action and in terms of thought.
With such unshakable moral beliefs forming so important a
part of his world-view, it is not surprising that Adams vigor
ously defended Jackson*s actions, even in the face of the oppo
sition of President Monroe, Treasury Secretary William Crawford,
War Secretary John C. Calhoun, and Attorney General William
135
Wirt. Andrew Jackson was, in effect, the moral agent who sought
to impose--or reimpose— a state of interactive equilibrium
among the members of the society delimited by the boundaries of
Florida. In such an environment, again in a state of moral
order, each person could pursue, by reason, his own means of
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self-fulfillment. And, because of this, it may be said that
Jackson was the unknowing actor bringing about a condition that
Adams favored. This favor was backed by a powerful will marked
by the belief that by his interpretation of divine thought, he
136
could covenent with God, and thereby regenerate mankind.
But Florida was merely the prelude to the far larger
question of the acquisition of the Oregon Territory. This was a
complicated affair which involved not only Spain, but also Bri
tain and Russia, and formed the grand theater within which
Adams' Lockean ideas concerning the state as an ordered moral
covenant could be played out. His desire to acquire this terri
tory lay deep in his belief that it was in the order of nature
that the moral improvement of man should keep pace with the
multiplication of his physical capacities, comforts, and enjoy137
ments. Consequently, because of such a belief, it is not sur
prising that Adams alone among American statesmen understood
138
the value of the Northwest. To his way of thinking, only the
Americans possessed this capacity in the highest degree, and
this multiplicative effort was intimately related to the capa
city to improve the environment by the creation and acquisition
139
of private property. To Locke, property amounted to an indivi
dual's moral power over his own, as it was his labor which
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acquired and "encloses it from the common". Consequently, Adams
may be said to have wished that as much of the North American
continent as possible be placed under the improving hand of the
American people so that the ordered, reasoned moral communitas
would be as large as possible so that God's will cbuld be done

as grandly as possible.
To accomplish this, Adams, both personally and through sub
ordinates, engaged in what turned out to be a complex series of
negotiations, sometimes alone; al? other times in combination
with other negotiations, such as those involving the Spanish
cession, or the rectification of the American-Canadian border.
Again, one may think of the intellectual processes of Adams as a
free variation of ideas, or what Locke thought of as the putting
together of simple ideas in new ways in order to produce complex
141
ones. The complex idea of Adams was that of an integrated soci
ety rescued from the separate corruptions of particular European
societies. The power to bring forth this idea lay in the ability
to place under consideration ideas which were out of sight, and
to do this at one's own choice, and then to compare which of
them one considered fit. Thought would be followed by action in
142
order to bring the idea into effect. Adams was therefore a per
son whose individuality was integrated by that complex idea
"America as a social compact", so much so that he could stand up
to any adversity. In his own words from the Lectures on Rhetoric
and Oratory: "The most strenuous energies of the human mind . .
are always employed, where they are instigated by the stimulus
143
of the highest rewards." Again, there was the free will under
stimulus of incentive— the moral and the pragmatic combined. It
is well that he thought this way because it would not be for
many years yet before the United States would acquire the Oregon
Territory.
As an illustration of Adams' determination to bring about

bo

this synthesis of ideas in reality, one may again cite the 1818
letter to George William Ervings
Your authority and instructions are amply sufficient for
the conclusion of a treaty and no alteration of them is
deemed necessary. It is, however, to be remarked that
the impression upon the public opinion of this country,
of our unquestionable right to the Rio Bravo as the wes
tern boundary, is from day to day becoming stronger, and
you will give it very distinctly to be understood, that
in offering now to agree by treaty to the substitute of
the Colorado, the United States will not hold themselves
bound to abide by the same offer at any future period.lbb
From what has been previously stated about Adams, it is evident
that this statement was expressed out of a profound conviction
of moral superiority. In terms of Locke, this action, and the
complex of other actions determining his pursuit of this pol
icy, sprang from an ’’uneasiness" which was a function of the
perceived moral necessity to bring about the intended result—
a United States which embraced both the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts. Locke summed up this perception by maintaining that the
greatest positive good determines uneasiness, and that uneasi1b5
ness determines the will.
Compelled by a moral imperative of such scale and inten
sity, Adams was equally determined the following year. In a
letter to Onis he stated".

. . the proposal to draw the western

boundary line between the United States and the Spanish terri
tories on this continent from the source of the Missouri to the
Columbia River cannot be admitted. I have to add . . . this
government repeats the proposal contained in my letter to you
of 31st October last; . . • But if your powers are incompetent
to accept either of these offers, the President thinks it uselb6
less to pursue the discussion any further." His intransigence
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bore fruit. The treaty was signed in 1819*
Within this same complex of actions adumbrated by the
moral imperative of American territorial expansion, John Quincy
Adams also dealt with Russia concerning trade and the Pacific
coastal boundaries. As early as 17^3 he had had a negative
147
opinion of that country, and in particular, its despotic rule.
However, his views subsequently moderated, particularly when he
was American Minister in St. Petersburg. Indeed, he grew to
praise Tsar Alexander I for his restrained European policies in
148
regard to the Holy Alliance. Nevertheless, a mildly positive
view of Russia was not allowed to bring about an acquiescence
in Russian attempts to claim the northwestern Pacific coast of
North America. Again, Adams' concept of the expansion of the
American moral covenant could not be denied. In an 1822 letter
to the Russian Foreign Minister, Pierre de Politica, he firmly
rejected the Russian claim that its sovereignty extended all
the way to the fifty-first degree of north latitude and to
within one hundred Italian miles of the coast, citing as rea
sons the right to navigate those waters as an inherent right of
national independence, and the right of American citizens to
149
trade with the Indians in the area. Here, Adams obviously
wished to establish a future American right of property. The
people of the United States should be free to extract from the
environment (in this case, by trade) what was necessary for
their sustenance, and to produce property from it. The tangible
realization of this right was provided by the American vessels
which hunted the sea otter, and which, by their presence,
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afforded the United States maritime supremacy on the Pacific
150
coast.
With this, it remains only to discuss some of John Quincy
Adams' preliminary sparring with the British over the Oregon
Territory and other matters. Again, his adamant position would
eventually have an effect— the complete transfer of that terri
tory to the United States. However, this would only occur many
years later as an event witnessed by John Quincy Adams, Con
gressman.
In the negotiations over Oregon his Anglophobia once
again manifested itself. It was evident both because he.was
against monarchies in general, stating quite categorically, "In
151
the theories of the Crown and the Mitre man had no rights", and
because he believed that Britain had sought to retard the full
development of the potential of the American political realm as
a social compact by first holding on to its American colonies
as long as possible, and then by continuing to adopt an arro
gant attitude in its relationship with a now independent United
States. For example, in an I8l6 letter to his father, he stated
that "Wherever British influence extends, it is busy to blacken
152
us in every possible manner."
As an illustration of this British abuse, one can study
the matter of trade. Trade was quite important to Locke, as he
maintained that it was very important in promoting the wealth
153
and power of a nation. Adams was in perfect accord with this.
This favorable attitude towards trade was bound up with the
recurring concept of property. The more goods, the more wealth
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acquired by trade, the more a nation has to utilize in regard
to manufacturing and acquiring property, or that which insures
the survivability of that society. The British frustration of
American trade designs may be looked upon as yet smother method
used by the British to frustrate the full development of the
American society as a social compact. In a letter to Albert
Gallatin and Benjamin Rush, American negotiators of an AngloAmerican trade agreement in 1818, dealing in part with the Bri
tish denial of American commerce with its West Indies colonies,
Adams stated: "When the British ministry say against all this
(trade with the West Indies), our ancestors established a sys
tem and therefore we must maintain it, we may reply, if your
ancestors establish a system in defiance of the laws of nature,
it is your interest and your duty to abolish it. But who can
overlook or be blind to the changes of circumstances of the
establishment and growth of the United States as an independent
154
power . . . " The obvious implication here is that the United
States was in conformance with the law of nature, and that
Great Britain was not.
According to Adams, an even more blatant example of this
transgressive behavior was British intransigence in the complex
and protracted dispute over the final ownership of the Oregon
Territory. In that same letter to Gallatin and Rush, he stated
that "the new pretension (after the disputateous negotiations
at Ghent) however, of disputing our title to the settlement at
the mouth of Columbia River, either indicates a design on their
part to encroach by new establishments of their own upon the
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forty-ninth parallel of latitude, south of which they can have
no valid claim upon this continent, or it manifests a jealousy
of the United States, a desire to check the progress of our
settlement, of which it might have been supposed that experi155
ence would before this day have relieved them." He could well
believe in the ultimate futility of the British attempts to
frustrate American settlement in Oregon, as he believed in the
Biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" in its sanction
of the supposed superior right of the American people to the
area as compared with that of the British agent, the Hudson's
156
Bay Company. He was thus prepared to prolong the diplomatic
stalemate. He could picture Oregon ever more completely occu
pied by ever larger numbers of Americans. Every visualization
of quantum increase; every visualization of new national prero
gatives springing forth as a function of the increasing num
bers; every visualization of the concomitant decline of British
power in the area--they all represented expressions of self,
and Adams' projection of himself into the future. This was, as
Locke would put it, the continuation of individual existence
157
commensurate with the succession of ideas in the mind.

THE LOCKEAN BASIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
There will now be an examination of the foreign policy of
John Quincy Adams in terms of Lockean content, essentially as
sl

extension of his work as Secretary of State, and as a

reflection of a Lockean concept of the Chief Executive. That
is, Locke treated foreign policy as the "Federative Power",
which is normally exercised by the head of state without subor-
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dination. Likewise, Adams believed that the President was the
supreme power in foreign affairs. For example, when he was Pre
sident, he resented a Senate request for papers that required
him to designate which of them were relevant to current negoti
ations and should therefore remain secret, maintaining that
159
this was a violation of the rules on executive business.
As President then, Adams had to deal with many of the
same problems he had dealt with as Secretary of State. They
involved the stability and independence of the new Latin Ameri
can republics; relations with France; and relations with Great
Britain concerning the Oregon Territory, trade, and boundary
rectifications. In addition, there were the problems of Greece,
and of Cuba, a Latin American dependency which had remained in
Spanish hands after other Spanish colonies in the New World had
revolted. Throughout, analysis of each of these problems will
again be in terms of such Lockean concepts as: (1) The state as
a condition of moral order; (2) The self as defined by con-
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sciousness; (3) The self as thought and action; and (4) Know
ledge as the product of mind. These and subsidiary concepts pro
vided a conceptual framework for a program of foreign relations
that was at onpe both morally and pragmatically in the national
interest. The result of such an ethic was a spirit of inventive160
ness and political compromise. However, interaction among men
within a Lockean framework would also produce moral restraint,
and because of Adams' profound moral sense, his pragmatism was
modified. As a result, his policies were characterized by an
essential honesty— as President, as well as, indeed, as Secre
tary of State— for which he was widely respected by the diploma161
tic community both in Washington and in Europe. In terms of
Locke, his concept of a foreign policy of equanimity was a mixed
mode synthesis of ideas which produced a conceptual structure
that was independent of the exigencies of empirical reality.
This combination of morality and pragmatism was also dem
onstrated in Adams' Secretary of State, Henry Clay. Like the
President, he believed in balance and harmony in foreign
affairs. But, whereas Adams relied upon conscience to impose
162
order, Clay relied more upon creative calculation. In effect,
their working relationship involved a dyadic Lockean synthesis.
At this point it would be relevant to discuss the ques
tion of the so-called "corrupt bargain" wherein Adams was sup
posedly electorally supported by Clay in the House of Represen
tatives, where the 1824 Presidential election had been thrown
when none of the candidates had received a majority of elec
toral votes, in exchange for being named Secretary of State.
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Actually, it would appear that there was a conceptual interact
ion between the two men which presaged their subsequent rela
tionship. For example, their thinking in foreign affairs had
expanded well beyond the merely regional outlooks characteris
tic of the other candidates, Crawford and Jackson. Its basis
was the exploitation of the initiatives of the Monroe Doctrine
163
in order to lend a positive effect to the course of change. In
effect, such a policy represented a Lockean emphasis upon
164
action as the best evidence of principle.
In order to determine precisely how much congruence there
indeed was between the thinking of the two men, Adams did
arrange a meeting, however. He described it in his diarys
Mr. Clay . . . spent the evening with me in a long con
versation explanatory of the past and prospective of the
future . . . He wished me, as far as I might think pro
per, to satisfy him with regard to some principles of
great public importance, but without any personal consi
derations for himself. In the question to come before
the House between General Jackson, Mr. Crawford, and
myself, he had no hesitation in saying that his prefer
ence would be for me. 165
The decision appears to have rested upon issue and belief,
rather than corrupt patronage. What is more, the writer of a
then anonymous letter accusing Adams and Clay of such corrup
tion, Representative George Kremer of Pennsylvania, later could
not, or would not, substantiate the charge before the House
166
investigatory committee which Clay had requested. Consequently,
one may at least surmise that belief and conscience were far
more evident here than sheer raw pragmatism.
A clue to the characteristics of Adams' conscience can be
found in his attitude towards obtaining that very Presidency

48
itself. In order for there to be an absence of evil consequen
ces accruing from his actions, there had to be equanimity of
effort. Therefore, if he were to be elected President, it would
have to be as the result of actions which did not cause strife
and animosity. An 1818 passage from his diary is illustrative!
He (Everett) also asked me if I was determined to do
nothing with a view to promote my future election to
the Presidency as the successor of Mr. Monroe. I told
him I should do absolutely nothing. He said that as
others would not be so scrupulous, I should not stand
upon equal footing with them. I told him that was not
my fault
my business was to serve the public to the
best of my abilities in the station assigned to me,
and not to intrigue for further advancement . . . 167
Within a Lockean framework, his universe of moral beliefs, in
interaction with his analytical mind, produced an integrated
paradigmatic envisioned structure of actions by the buildup of
simple ideas, existing passively in his mind, into complex
ideas. The dynamic of their combining and recombining pro
duced an outline of action, which could be powerfully put into
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effect.
This contained power of the mind was intimately related
to intellectual and moral autonomy, which Adams possessed in
abundance. In this instance, it focused upon an unwillingness to
make political deals, as he stated: "If that office (the Presi
dency) was to be the price of cabal and intrigue, of purchasing
newspapers, bribing by appointments, or bargaining for foreign
169
missions, I had no ticket in that lottery . . ." A rigid moral
belief here may be said to have caused Adams to produce, by a
combination and recombination of ideas concerning the degrading
consequences of alternative patterns of actions, a will to
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resolve the uneasiness attendant to the temptations involved in
wishing to he the President of the United States. From that
resolution of uneasiness it would simply he one more logical
step to project that effort to resolve contending forces into
the social reality as a whole. An abstract balancing of social
forces would he the justification for his effort as President,
which would, in turn, regulate his desires, or personal ambi
tions. Rationality would he used to regulate all activities,
both public and private, in a grand moral state. And, with
this, there would also be a further strong abstract reason why
he could never have entered into the "corrupt bargain".
In an individual sense, moral certainty was produced. For
Adams, this could only have been the equivalent of knowledge.
In a Lockean sense, moral knowledge, since it comes from God,
is capable of real certainty, which is the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of ideas. Moral ideas are complete,
and hence, the perception of the agreement or disagreement
170
among them produces real knowledge, unalloyed by misperception.
This certainty, in Adams' case, took on a Puritan cast, and
guided his actions. Indeed, in 1826, he engaged in a public
profession of faith, a tradition which had originated with the
171
Puritans. By actively seeking the Presidential nomination, he
would be lending credibility to faction, or political party,
thereby lending legitimacy to conditions marking a departure
from the homogeneously moral. The synthesis of true knowledge,
and its resultant actions, would not occur.
In a more wide-ranging sense, a moralistic synthesis of
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balance was characteristic of his "American System" in both
172
foreign and domestic affairs. In the former, a good example of
this would be the Monroe Doctrine. This document transformed
the Lockean principles of self-determination, self-identifica
tion, and self-protection into the three ideological norms of
173
American foreign policy. It meant that a Lockean atmosphere of
moral order in which reason prevailed would apply to the entire
Western hemisphere, free of European interference. .The United
States would be hegemonous as the proclaimer to mankind of the
inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful
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foundations of government. Indeed, American diplomats in Latin
America, under Adams' administration, operated within this con175
ception.
At the same time, in a pragmatic synthesis characteristic
of Locke, Adams believed in a balance of power among nations,
an interactive state controlled by the reasonable perceptions
and actions of reasonable men. It would be a projection of the
moral person into the international sphere. Morality implys
reciprocity, for only in this can respect for rights such as
individuality and property be maintained, while at the same
time preserving an atmosphere of freedom in which one can
accomplish one's aims. With such a firm moral basis, Adams
could have no doubt about the pragmatic aims with which such a
morality was alloyed. At the same time, the adherence to such a
synthesis meant that he could be an expansionist and an imperi176
alist, but in the name of an idealism of anti-imperialsim. This
ability to combine contradictions of thought and action into a
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mixed mode synthesis was a measure of the power and flexibility
of his mind.
Trade was a policy which manifested this. For Adams, its
basic tenets were reciprocal equality of access to the world's
markets in time of peace, and a preservation of neutral rights
177
to that freedom of trade in times of war. Trade would be based
upon complex and involved ideas resulting from the gathering of
data from trade, simple ideas, and the powerful combining of
the empirical and the imaginative into concepts which were both
abstract and applicable. Indeed, according to Locke, general
and certain truths could only be founded upon the dispositions
178
and relations of abstract ideas. The true conception here would
be a workable paradigm which would accomodate many contingen
cies of reality in order to bring about not only a conceptual
enrichment for those immediately involved by opening up new
opportunities for the reception of ideas and perceptions, but
also a national enrichment. This controlling paradigm would
exist as a sense of moral imperative which would project beyond
experience into an integral view of the world. This view would
grow out of the non-relativism of moral concepts, which exist
179
as immutably as the axioms of geometry, and which are therefore
balanced and non-deformable in their application. This was
reflected in the thinking of John Quincy Adams, as he regarded
every public measure subjected to his consideration as essenti180
ally a Euclidean proposition. Such balanced thinking extended
into the reality of nations meant that all of them were equal
in regard to their external relations.
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However, this type of thinking was put to a severe test
when he dealt with the issue of trade with the British West
Indies colonies. Adams regarded this problem, and the right to
colonial trade in general, to be, next to impressment, the most
important problem between Great Britain and the United States
181
since American independence had been won. In this instance, he
was obliged to deal with statesmen who had perhaps not yet
reconciled themselves to American independence, and who were,
as a result, not yet ready to concede that the two countries
were equals. The British statesmen, in effect, refused to con
ceive of the United States as a moral person, an entity posses
sing ethical legitimacy. According to Locke, ethical concepts
182
are mixed modes. In this usage, they are scattered and indepen
dent ideas which are put together by the mind. They have no
183
relationship to real beings. They are universals, applicable in
a protean manner. Thus, Locke believed that universals are made
only when the mind abstracts, and abstraction is a mental oper18**
ation which is distinct from sensation. Nevertheless, before
the ethical concept of the moral person could be synthesized, a
balanced series of conceptualizations, unalloyed by prejudices,
would have to occur, because the cognate ideas would be derived
from empirical models. These empirical models were obviously
negatively one-sided, involving memories of defeat in war, the
betrayal of British institutions by a people who once called
themselves Englishmen, and so forth. These empirically-derived
ideas obviously could not be made to form the mixed mode of
which the ethical concept consisted. An unbalanced synthesis
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was the result; a syncretic concept involving a portrait of the
United States as evil— despite the non-empirical potential of
the mixed mode--rather than as an inherent constituent of a
world moral order. And, since actions would put into effect
such ideas, reciprocity of trade could not be accepted by the
British as a policy with their one-time colony.
These ideas in mind, the British began to deal with the
Americans over the issue of trade with their West Indies colo
nies. In this, they effected a supercilious assumption of supe185
riority. It was emotional, perhaps with a degree of revenge in
mind. On the other hand, John Quincy Adams dedicated himself to
a painstaking regulation of his activities in this sphere, as
in all others, by conscience and a goal-oriented rationality.
The goal in this case was trade expansion, which he and his
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Secretary of State, Henry Clay, would work towards.
Adams' dealings with the British had reached back through
his tenure as Secretary of State to his efforts as chief Ameri
can negotiator at Ghent in I8l4. That has already been touched
upon. And, they had always proved refractory. Nevertheless, the
two countries had carried on a flourishing trade for years.
After Ghent, he had signed a commercial convention of trade
reciprocity in London which reflected this, and remained the
legal basis for commercial relations between the two countries
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throughout this period. What is more, on June Zb% 1821, Parlia
ment had passed an act which had opened certain British North
American ports to commercial American vessels. In return, Pres
ident Monroe had proclaimed American ports open to British ves-
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sels employed in trade between the United States and the West
188
Indies. Here, because of the mutual perception of similar ideas,
in regard to trade and other matters, there was at least the
possibility of effecting a synthesis of a mixed mode of moral
perception, which would have, in time, perhaps led to a belief
in reciprocity arising in other areas. The possibility of a
significant easing of tensions between the two nations presented
itself.
However, such an occurrence was not to be, at least during
the 1817 to 1829 period, when John Quincy Adams controlled Amer
ican foreign policy. For example, according to the 1821 Act,
Britain retained certain protective duties which gave advantages
to the commerce of her North American colonies in the West
189
Indies. What is more, Britain ignored the fact that the trade
was strictly limited to certain enumerated colonial ports for
American vessels

and to certain enumerated articles, which

excluded New England products such as fish and salted provi
sions, and that the United States did not gain access to the
190
indirect traffic through the West Indies.
One result of this egregious situation was the fact that
tensions were heightened between New England, which relied heav
ily on fisheries, and the rest of the country, which was agri191
cultural. Centrifugal forces were at work, militating against
the concept of the moral state. The fixed integrity of that
moral' concept had to be maintained for the mixed mode of moral
perception to exist. According to Locke, power and action form
192
the greatest part of the mixed modes, and have the greatest
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effect upon the mind. The actors in this instance would he New
Englanders. The balanced, integral rationality of the moral
perception would be, with this, the victim of empirical exi
gency existing independently of its empirical complement, i.e.,
the other areas of the country. Action had to be faced with
counteraction. The synthesis of the moral state had to be
allowed to proceed, certainly before its values could be inte
grated enough to be projected over the radius of the entire
hemisphere. Adams acted.
In 1823 Congress, under his direction, opened American
ports to British ships coming from colonial ports, but only
from precisely those ports to which American ships were admit193
ted. Supposedly, the British would be forced by this to pragma
tically act in order to produce an actual equilibrium of trade.
There would be a comparison of ideas, this time embodied in
causes and effects, in order to produce models of consequences.
194
This model would be a mode, called by Locke a relation, which
would eventually evolve by a process of comparison into a mode
more nearly resembling that of the moral equilibrium which
Adams envisioned.
However, the situation did not resolve itself in that
direction. Congress had also authorized the President to impose
a ten percent discriminatory tariff on colonial goods transpor
ted in British vessels until Britain eliminated all colonial
195
preferences. Accordingly, on May 12, 1826, Huskisson, President
of the British Board of Trade, gave a speech before the House
of Commons, in which he stated that his country had been forced
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into a situation of trade reciprocity in the fi^st place
because of the compulsion of the retaliatory duties enacted by
196
the United States. Britain then again barred American trade
197
with its West Indies possessions. British prejudices against
Americans had produced an uneasiness in the combining of ideas,
which militated against their resolution in terms of a moral
equilibrium. Essentially, that was what Adams had feared. In
1823 he had informed Richard Rush that he doubted that counter
vailing American restrictions would enable American vessels to
198
trade in equal competition with the British. The British were
simply not willing to formulate the moral paradigm, or mixed
mode, of reciprocity of trade.
A somewhat similar situation prevailed with France, which
evinced the same type of refractory behavior. But, at the same
time, Adams could view that nation in a more considered light.
For one thing, he saw that while France was cloaking its
actions by rhetoric proclaiming the rights of man, it was actu199
ally engaging in plunder and conquest. He also considered that,
because of this, French ideology was a radical threat to the
security of the United States, and that France itself was part
200
of the overal problem of the instability of Europe. Now, insta
bility implies irrationality, the greatest enemy of the moral
universe that Adams wished to synthesize. The ideals of revolu
tionary France may be thought of as a concatenation of simple
impressions and other types of information which were caused to
combine in the mind in ways which did not serve moral ends.
They would not be integrated into an autonomous concept, and
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would lack the balance bf moral order. One had only to look to
the example of the Reign of Terror. To Adams, the theories
growing out of the French Revolution were further from true
201
democracy than the practices of the British House of Commons.
If those theories were a mixed mocLe of a complex form conceptu
ally inimical to American interests, it had to be because the
simple ideas of which it consisted were themselves inimical to
American interests, since, although the ideas were subjected to
free variation in the mind, that same mind varied collections
202
of ideas only, and not the original characteristics of the
ideas themselves. There were limits to the mind's level of
paradigmatic manipulation.
Adams sought a way out of the quandary of having the two
most powerful European nations hostile to the United States.
2 03
The solution was to use France as a counterweight to Britain.
This idea would represent a congruence of Lockean political and
philosophical ideas. Politically, since the relationships
between nations are not naturally peaceful, like the state of
nature between persons, a balance of power is the only rational
20^
solution. This condition of balance may be thought of as a
mixed mode conceptualization in which the ideas "Britain" and
"France", with all their attendant characteristics in regard to
the United States, were first combined under the subsumption
"Britain and France" in order to form relations of ideas.
According to Locke, these relations consist of the considera2°5
tion and comparison of ideas. They are then combined into ideas
which are given the moral sanction of balance.
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However, on a more mundane level, because of French hos
tility, there were trade difficulties. In 1822 France, which
had signed a temporary agreement to reciprocally abandon dis
criminating duties over the next four years, repeatedly
expressed its dissatisfaction with American tariffs on spirits
and silk, and threatened to abrogate the agreement. In 1826 and
1827» after Adams had become President, the French began to
rigidly enforce regulations which levied high tariffs on indi
rect American traffic. The United States eventually yielded to
such pressure, reducing levies on French imports, such as wine,
and, in effect, creating a barter arrangement, because the
resulting increase in American sales of French products pre
cisely offset the costs of American products, such as cotton,
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tobacco, and potash, to France. It was a forced, and not a nat
ural reciprocity, and had been purged of any potential for a
moral dimension. Since the basic ideas comprising the two mixed
mode concepts of trade reciprocity were incompatible, and since
mixed modes are abstract and complex concepts, their conceptual
outlines could never be reconciled by empirically-derived
ideas. Either trade was reciprocal, with its moral sanction, or
it was not. The situation was disillusioning, and, in Adams,
such a process produced stubbornness. An entry from his diary
is illustrative:
Mr. Clay brought a written note from the French Minis
ter, the Baron de Mareuil, requesting that I would
appoint a time when he would come and offer me his con
gratulations on the New Year and present to me all the
members of his Legation; which I declined • . . Mr.
Clay had prepared an answer, expressing much acknow
ledgment for the kindness of the Baron, but that no
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usage, having warranted such a formality, I did not feel
justified to introduce it. 2 0 7
Adams would brook no interference with his concept of moral
order.
With Latin America also, there was an attempt at a genu
ine reciprocity of trade. Here, again, he called for treatment
on a footing of most-favored, most friendly nation, and empha
sized that American disagreements with the Latin American
states arose from commercial discriminations which favored
208
other nations, and privateers and paper blockades. He pointed
to the commercial treaties which the United States had with
Colombia and Central America as successful efforts to eliminate
such practices and to establish reciprocity. It is important to
note that Adams did not wish for European nations— especially
Great Britain— to establish colonies in Latin America, with
their closed systems of trade, because such a development would
209
interfere with the existing rights of the United States. Hence,
trade considerations may be understood as a factor in the Amer
ican ability to integrate the Latin American republics into a
moral universe under its leadership. This consideration was
uppermost in the mind of John Quincy Adams. He was little
210
influenced by the business community.
Balance and equanimity also characterized the efforts of
Adams (and Clay) as they sought to resolve the problem of the
northern boundary of the United States. This was very important
to Adams, as he felt that the selfish and intriguing policies
211
of Europe were a disturbing influence on American life. The
boundaries of the moral state had to be precisely delimited in
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order to reflect the definitive relinquishment of sovereignty
by the chaotic and immoral monarch to that moral state in which
God's will could be done. What is more, the constant invasion
of foreign (British, Spanish, or Russian) elements across an
inexact border would cause the untoward infusion of inimical
concrete ideas into the thinking of the inhabitants of that
state, thereby delaying the synthesis of the mixed mode
abstract.intellectual entity which comprised the idea of the
moral state, or the state as a moral person. This was an old
problem Adams had faced.
He endeavored to negate this process, especially in view
of the fact that he believed that Great Britain was looking for
212
territory everywhere, and because much of his effort was a con
tinuation of policies he had pursued as Secretary of State.
Therefore, both he and his Secretary of State, Henry Clay,
attempted to bring about a settlement of the Canadian border,
and to define the bounds of American sovereignty over the Ore
gon Territory. Thus, to Adams, the idea of the moral, rational
state developing and gaining strength, unalloyed by foreign
ideologies, had an air of inevitability. Because of this, he
believed that all North America must, in time, fall into Ameri213
can hands. This conviction was, again, an instance of his trust
in the efficacy of reason, as he had confidence in the achieve
ment of virtue under the pressure of conscience and inborn
21**
will. In Lockean terms, the attainment of this state (of the
realization of national destiny) would be the resolution of
some uneasiness, resolving itself into a corporate moral person
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characterized by the sum of the rights of all its members. In
effect, there would be a stable institutionalization of the
Lockean principles of self-determination (the self as thought
and action), self-identification (the self defined by consciuosness), and self-protection (the production of property as
215
the definer of self). As a corollary of this, since, according
to Locke, if all men have rights, then boundaries are neces216
sary, the complete distinguishing of America, the moral person,
from a world still largely controlled by chaotic and corrupt
monarchies would inhere in the generalized corporate definition
of those boundaries. What is more, to Adams, this moral person
could then perpetuate itself, for to him, common sympathies
belonged and were indispensable to the relations that were
217
ordained by nature between the individual and his country.
One area of boundary instability was the northeastern
corner of the United States. Here, Maine and Massachusetts
asserted claims along the St. John River, so much so that an
American settler, John Baker, was arrested by New Brunswick
authorities for holding title to what they considered to be
Canadian territory. Albert Gallatin, American Minister to Bri
tain, was instructed to submit the dispute to arbitration, an
218
arrangement completed in September, 1827*
Again, there was the idea of rational balance. In this
instance, the purpose of the conceptual balance was the obvia
tion of British hostility by reason, and the delimitation of
the area over which Americans could exercise their will and
their choice in synthesizing those elements from the environ
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ment necessary for the creation of the moral state. Again, in
producing such a mixed mode, one had to be careful that ideas
derived from a troubled reality— a reality disturbed by the
untoward perception of British power--were not limited in num
ber and range by such a consideration. Being so limited by a
comparison of British actions with moral rules, for example,
the free variation of ideas needed to produce a mixed mode syn
thesis could not take place. Such a situation would have been
of particular importance to Locke, as he had human actions,
particularly of moral significance, in mind when he discussed
219
mixed modes. The effects of arbitration offered a greater pos
sibility for the free variation of ideas than if all American
ideas were simply concepts of British hostility.
The effects of such inimical thinking were obvious. For
example, Adams put this entry in his diary for 1827*
He (Levi Lincoln) spoke of the late correspondence
between his brother Enoch Lincoln, the Governor of
Maine, and the Secretary of State, relating to our con
troversy with Great Britain concerning the Northeastern
boundary, and expressed much regret at the temper which
the Governor of Maine had exhibited in it . . . A s to
this Northeastern boundary, there was an express
engagement which bound the partner to refer the ques
tion to the decision of a friendly sovereign, but the
Commissioners had disagreed upon the facts, as upon
everything else, and there was, and could be, no issue
made up until a statement of facts could be agreed
upon between the two Governments, to be submitted to
the arbitrator. 220
In a Lockean sense, these negative feelings were the result of
a comparison of action with rule, in a relation, which is
221
another interaction of ideas, which is active, in comparison
to the mixed mode endpoint of the process. The emotional situa
tion was obviously unstable, so much so that the controversy
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remained open for many years. This was primarily because the
British wished to construct a military road across the disputed
222
territory to the ice-free port of St. John, Nova Scotia. It
would appear that irreconciliably different ideas of actions,
and hence, mixed modes, were involved, and since mixed modes
are abstract, once formed, they would be peculiarly impervious
to non-paradigmatic empirically-derived models of action.
The same irreconciliability involved the attitudes
towards the other borders with British North American posses
sions. The negotiations for the settlement of the Great Lakes
boundary collapsed in 1827» when Britain demanded access to the
channel which was to the south, rather than to the north, of
St. George’s Island, in the Neebish Straits of St. Mary's
223
River. This revealed, again, a very aggressive British atti
tude. To that, Adams could only counterpoise reason. However,
it was a temporally effecting reason whose inevitability he
believed the British would, in time, concede. Just as he
believed that the British position in Oregon was hopeless
because of the superior American population and material
resources in the area, he believed that a rational considera
tion of the situation from their point of view would lead to a
reciprocal state of affairs. The following illustrative passage
was penned when Adams was Secretary of State, but the policies
he subsequently followed as President were consistent with this
way of thinking:
If the United States leave her (Great Britain) in undis
turbed enjoyment of all her holds upon Europe, Asia, and
Africa, with all her actual possessions in this hemi
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sphere, we may very fairly expect that she will not
think it consistent either with a wise or a friendly
policy, to watch with eyes of jealousy and alarm, every
possibility of extension to our natural dominion in
North America, which she can have no solid interest to
prevent, until all possibility of her preventing it
shall have vanished. 224
This was a reasoned, rationalist view of historical process, a
natural and impersonal process of human forces, actions, and
225
instincts, according to time and place. Through this unfolding
process, the "moral person" of the United States would most
fully realize its individuality by being free to utilize the
environment, without interference, for rational purposes of
moral development and survival. Hostile forces embodied in
ideas, being without a rational basis, i.e., one based upon the
freedom and dignity of the individual, and thereby congruent
with God's will, would inevitably be swept aside. This would
occur because the freedom to labor to improve the environment
by producing one's own property is an inherent right protected
226
by a just government. One would have far greater confidence
that such property would be protected, and not confiscated, by
a democratic, i.e., American, government, than by an arbitrary
monarchical, i.e., British, government. Adams' distrust of
such governments was uttered on numerous occasions. For
instance, in his address of July 4, 1821 he declared: "In the
227
theories of the Grown and the Mitre man had no rights."
This same distrust, of course, was evident in other bor
der disputes. The American envoy to Britain, Albert Gallatin,
could not obtain American access to the navigation of the St.
Lawrence River in 1826. What is more, faced with British

65
intransigence over the question of the Oregon Territory, he was
willing to push the forty-nine degree line far to the south
228
after having crossed the line of the Columbia River. However,
Adams and Clay, alarmed by Gallatin's propensity to give up so
much, sharply limited his authority. A communication from Adams
to Clay is quite explicits
I propose to you to write him (Gallatin) a short letter
immediately, stating that excepting any stipulation,
involving a cession of territory, belonging to any
state in the Union, or the abandonment express or
implied, of the right to navigate the St. Lawrence, or
the surrender of any territory South of Lat.
on the
North-West-Coast, he will in all cases consider his
Instructions as expressing our present views, and not
as limiting his Powers. 229
A will was at work here, determined to see the United States
expand across the North American continent. This message was
simply another expression of Adams' belief that providence had
created the United States for the purpose of civilizing North
America, and through that example, to eliminate from the face
230
of the earth all forms of European colonialism. This grand
belief that he held as President, however, produced its own
internally-generated moral sanction which led to a rational,
displaced equilibrium. The implication of this sanction was
reciprocity, that is, mutual non-interference. Hence, his
declaration that the United States would not interfere with
British sovereignty elsewhere in the world.
This matter of displaced equilibrium, in the sense that
natural state boundaries should be allowed to evolve, free from
colonializing interference, also arose in the matter of Greece.
At first glance, it would appear that President Adams, in

66
adhering to Lockean principles, would commit the resources of
the United States to assisting the Greeks in their attempt to
rid themselves of oppressive Ottoman rule. However, since such
precepts would emphasize the exercise of free and rational will
in order to formulate policies in the national interest as
231
maneuverings within a state of nature, he would not allow moral
considerations to become predominant in formulating policies
towards Greece.
The problem began

when Adams was Secretary of State. When

the Greek revolt began in 1821, American public opinion was in
favor of aid to the insurgents because they were considered to
be the descendents of the Greek forefathers who had revealed
their greatness in the arts, philosophy, literature, and gov232
ernment, and because Turkish oppression was so brutal. However,
by 1823s popular interest in their cause had waned, and Adams,
as Secretary of State, strongly argued against American inter
vention because, among other considerations, he did not wish
233
to needlessly antagonize the Holy Alliance. It might also be
surmised that he opposed American aid to Greece because he was
so guided by rationalism, in general. The Philhellinism which
had so fascinated the American people was an emotional parox
ysm, rather than a reasoned conviction. In Lockean terms, it
23^
was error caused by a lack of proofs. Since, to Locke, ideas
235
are propositions dealing with logic and morality, and since
knowledge is the result of a meticulous comparison of empirical
ideas in order to discern their agreement or disagreement, a
lack of ideas derived from the empirical environment was what
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characterized such emotional feelings. Reason had not been
brought to bear upon the problem, and it was reason which
guided Adams.
The Greek problem reappeared after Adams had become Pres
ident. In September, 1825 he sent William C. Somerville on a
secret mission to Greece in order to investigate the progress
of the revolt. He was to assure the Greek authorities that the
American people wished that liberty and independence were
re-established there. But, Somerville died en route, and three
months later, in April, 1826, the Greek revolt was ruthlessly
put down at Missolonghi. Nevertheless, Adams continued to
236

encourage the Greek desire for independence, perhaps because of
the emotional and timeless quality of the mixed mode concept
"Greek self-government". In such a situation it could be said
that Greece bore somewhat the same relationship to the Ottoman
Empire that the United States bore to Great Britain, but with
out the obviating factor of a similarity of institutions, and
hence the abstract transmutation of their conceptual character
istics into a mixed mode concept of morality, or some other
conceptual generality. Ottoman repression had forced the Greeks
to preclude certain courses of action which would have made
them amenable to the kinds of perceptions necessary for the
synthesis of a fully-developed knowledge leading to a sense of
national identity. This sense of national identity would exist
as the certainty of moral knowledge arrived at, as always, by
237
examining the agreement or the disagreement of ideas. Actions
would be judged by their denial or affirmation of that idea.
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Since moral imperatives were involved here, Adams could not sim
ply abandon interest in the Greek cause. However, within a Lock
ean framework emphasizing the rational working out of solutions
to problems, he had to act pragmatically due to the severe limi
tations of American military power. No aid of that kind would be
forthcoming.
Another— and far more important— area of Adams* moral con
cern was Latin America. The fate of the new republics there
would preoccupy him as President as it had preoccupied him as
Secretary of State, when he formulated the Monroe Doctrine. His
actions in this area were determined by a mixture of rationalist
pragmatism, a characteristic of the thinking of Locke, in which
primacy was placed upon commercial reciprocity, and a desire
that America exercise a moral tutelage over the South American
republics. This was to be accomplished by the projection over
the rest of the hemisphere of the coordinate state incorporated

23 8
into the American constitutional system. The Monroe Doctrine was
to be universalized, and all European powers excluded. As Presi
dent of the United States now, instead of merely Secretary of
State, Adams had more power to attempt to carry out this pro
cess. In a Lockean sense, he was motivated by an uneasiness in
the form of the recognition of moral imperative. The greater the
uneasiness, the stronger the will, and it is the will that

239
directs our operative faculties to some action. This action
would involve the founding of an international state which would
be, in effect, bound by the social compact of which the United
States was the exemplar. The test of its legitimacy would not
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only be whether the new independent nations of Latin America
accepted American tutelage, but also whether Spain, or the
powerful nations of Europe, would succeed or fail in an attempt
to reimpose a colonial state upon them. Adams conceived of this
in starkly apocalyptic terms as a conflict between despotism
240
and constitutionalism which would settle the fate of the world.
In this effort the penetration of American ideas was cru
cial. Consequently, as early as 1810 the United States govern
ment had sent commercial agents to Argentina, which had
recently begun to throw off Spanish rule. At the same time, the
revolutionary governments in Latin America had sent agents to
the United States to plead for American recognition of their

241
independence. Early in 1822, partly because of the achievements
of the Spanish-American revolutionaries, and partly because of
the ratification of the Florida Treaty with Spain, Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams and President James Monroe felt that
conditions were at last propitious for the recognition of South
242
American independence.
In the application of the rational to formulate this pol
icy and to act, both moral and pragmatic ideas concerning the
reactions of Spain and other European states, trade impera
tives, the state of American military power, and so forth, were
subjected, both individually and interactively, to a process
involving the synthesizing of a mixed mode, an abstract concept
of order. In a Lockean sense, the mind exercised an active
power in combining a number of ideas, without examining whether
they had existed together in nature, as long as they were con
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sistent in the understanding. Such a synthesis would produce a
vigorous and coherent framework of policy, effectively activa
ted whenever there was confrontation with a challenging situa
tion. This framework was the Monroe Doctrine, which Adams con
tinued to uphold as President, and in which the new Latin Amer
ican nations expressed interest, perhaps in order to lend moral
sanction to their actions; almost certainly to seek protection
for their fragile independence. Indeed, Colombia, Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico not only took a special interest in the
Doctrine; they also urged the United States to agree to mea244
sures to insure respect for it.
These same Latin American nations continued to struggle

against Spanish rule, and by late 1825 the final remnants of
245
that rule on the American continents had been destroyed. In
order to bring about a reasoned environment in which states
tacitly recognized by the United States as independent could be
246
coevals in the state of nature, and to regain the diplomatic
initiative because Great Britain had already officially recog
nized Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia at the end of 1824, Adams
entered into a diplomatic effort which was designed to bring
247
about Spanish recognition of the new republics. Here, his
Anglophobia again asserted itself, but instead of manifesting
itself as an assertion of an independent stance for the United
States, it manifested itself as an assertion of an independent
stance for Latin America. As long as these republics could be
subservient to Britain, because of its vast naval and economic
power, the nascent ideas defining the conscious national sense
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of selfhood of these nations would he subservient to the power
of Britain to invoke idea, much as the United States had been
during the years immediately following the American Revolution.
In this instance, the idea was "Britain, the most powerful of
nations". Since ideas are extracted from experience by reflect2^8
ion and sensation, and then projected beyond experience, the
pursuit of aggressive policies by Britain in Latin America
would militate against the creation of any mixed mode concept
of national identity because such a process would cause the
precluding, nolens volens, of certain actions and resultant
experiences by the Latin Americans which would challenge Brit
ish power. What is more, the crippling tutelage of Spain would
serve somewhat the same function. For example, the South Ameri
can states sometimes granted special favors and privileges to
2k9
Spain as the price of their recognition. Fear of Spanish power
was still evident.
Anglo-American rivalry was thereby set, and confronta
tions inevitably occurred. In Argentina, for example, Forbes,
the American Minister, waged a one-man battle for years to
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thwart British commercial and political influence there. With
such considerations in mind, then, the United States government
negotiated a series of treaties with the Latin American states.
Their basis was to be unqualified reciprocity and most favored

251
nation treatment. With this arrangement a ground of equanimity
would provide the proper array of ideas for the mixed mode syn
thesis of national identity--under American guidance. However,
with the synthesis would come the "moral person", truly a
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coeval with the United States and all other nations, therebyeliminating the possibility of American, British, Spanish, or
any other conceptual or potential hegemony. The transcendentally moral would triumph, and hence, what was at first both
moral and pragmatic would become exclusively moral. Such would
be the full realization of the potential of the ideas of

Locke. Accordingly, in 1825* when Adams became President, the
first United States legation in Spanish America was estab252
lished in Bogota, Colombia.
However, this desire to eliminate foreign hegemony was
not merely confined to the United States. Colombia and Mexico
looked at Cuba and Puerto Rico, and noticed that they were
still under Spanish rule. They thereupon prepared to launch
military expeditions to liberate them. Adams urged them to
desist, and to give time to Emperor Nicholas I of Russia and
his allies to persuade King Ferdinand of Spain to save those
islands by recognizing the independence of the Latin American
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republics. In other words, the United States would be content
to see the islands remain in Spanish hands. Colombia and Mex
ico, if they had taken Cuba and Puerto Rico, would not have
possessed sufficient military power to defend them. Thus,
other European powers besides Spain would have invaded those
25^
islands, doubtless clothing their actions in moral terms.
In the event, another European power did attempt to move
into Cuba, but not by means of military conquest. Canning, Bri
tish Foreign Secretary, moved to prevent American domination of
the Western hemisphere, though American and British policy— the
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prevention of entrance into Latin America by any third nation—

255
for the time being, coincided. In Lockean terms, the abstract
mixed mode concepts held by Britain and the United States, each
being voluntary concatenations of simple ideas, profoundly dif
fered. One was at once both pragmatic and moral, with these two
components interacting with and modifying each other during
modal formation; the other was merely pragmatic, mainly econo
mic. Yet, the short-term concepts were paradigmatically united
by immediate knowledge. This knowledge consisted of the fact
that the French commander in the Caribbean had standing orders
to assist Spain in defending Cuba and Puerto Rico. Accordingly,
Secretary of State Clay invited Canning to join the United
States in declaring to the French that those two islands were
256
not to be transferred to another European nation. Canning
rejected this offer, so great was his distaste for the United
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States. His behavior may be thought of as having originated
from a mixed mode compounded of his negative emotions concern
ing America, ideas about Spanish weakness, French power, future
commercial advantages for Britain in Cuba, and so forth. These
were the factors which, in Lockean terms, defined the type of

258
action which constituted a given instance of behavior. They
would define Canning's behavior as he subsequently prepared to
present a case against the United States at the Congress of
Panama.
This great assembly was to be the great legitimizing
forum for American plans to place Latin America within its
moral tutelage. So important was this to Adams that his Secre-

7^
tary of State, Henry Clay, was preoecupied with it for most of
259
his tenure. Having first been suggested by the Colombian Minis
ter to the United States, Jose" Maria Salazar, in 182^, the idea
259
was eventually accepted by Adams after he became President. In
practical terms, the Congress was to have the typical Lockean
characteristics of the empirical and the moral. As Adams sta
ted: " . . .

And lastly, the Congress of Panama is believed to

present a fair occasion for urging upon all the new nations of
the South the just and liberal principles of religious

260
liberty . . . "

This utterance was in conformance with the Lock

ean belief that the moral status of political societies derives
from their capacity to serve as instruments for man's struggles
to discharge the religious assignments for which God had cre261
ated him— and it was in conformance with Adams' beliefs. These
took the form of a moral imperative, which his mother had
inculcated into him even as a child, as she urged him to always
262
turn to religion. Religion, a collection of simple ideas which
formed a mixed mode of moral symmetry, was to be the basis of
moral action, particularly on an anthropocentric plane.
Somewhat secularized, this moral action concerning the
interrelationship of man with man would also be interpreted as
bringing Latin America within the purview of the Monroe Doc
trine. Of course, from the American point of view, the Congress
of Panama would reaffirm that tenet. At the same time, the
northern press advocated a Pan-American Congress in order to
eliminate foreign commercial competition from potential Ameri263
can trade with South America. Again, with the absorption of
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this idea by the administrationf there was primacy placed upon
the Lockean concept of pragmatism combined with morality. That
is, commercial interests and the legitimization of an American
moral imperium were both given high priority for the Congress,
but by different interest groups, each rationally perceiving
its interests.
At this point, the fate of the Congress must be depic
ted. Originally, it was the idea of Simon Bolivar, who issued
a call for the Congress of Panama in a circular letter of Dec264
ember 7» 1824. Five months later, after invitations had been
offered to the United States by the Ministers of Colombia and
Mexico, Secretary of State Clay endorsed acceptance, and Adams
authorized him to do so, stating that such a Congress "might
be highly useful in settling several important disputed ques
tions of public law, and in arranging other matters of deep
interest to the American Continent, and to the friendly inter
course between the American Powers . . . "

Adams subsequently

nominated Richard C. Anderson, Jr., of Kentucky, and John Ser
geant, of Pennsylvania, as ministers, and William B. Roches265
ter, of New York, as secretary to the mission.
However, the announcement of American participation in
the proposed Congress drew fierce partisan criticism which
centered around the supposition that such participation would
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draw the United States into an "entangling alliance". It could
be stated that there was a perception that the individuality
of the moral person of the United States had to be preserved.
By supposedly interacting with the ideas of the representa-
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tives of the Latin American republics, individuality would be
lost, because the mixed mode of ideas which defined the
national self would be conceptually compromised. The sense of
collective personal, i.e., national, identity, which is consti267
tuted by consciousness of self, would be obviated, the bounda
ries of the self eroded. What is more, there would presumably
arise the possibility of an alienation of future from past
national consciousness as entangling involvement with other
nations would bring about thoughts and actions perhaps congru
ent with other national consciousnesses with their own unique
mixed mode conceptualizations. In the words of Locke 1 "For it
is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and
actions that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same
self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions
268
past or to come." Translating this into empirical terms, what
was feared was a loss of national sovereignty, and a concomit
ant loss of the clear perception of national interest.
The Congressional enemies of the Adams administration,
led by the supporters of John C. Calhoun, therefore produced a
report which called for pursuing commercial equality and mari
time rights which would be realized through bilateral treaties

5

leaving religious matters to the domestic policies of the indi
vidual nationsj and deferring concern for the fate of other
269
Spanish colonies in America until actual danger arose. These
men were not willing to see any coalition of other nations
force their interests upon the United States. More abstractly,
these men attempted to undermine the very Lockean basis of
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American policy towards Latin America by limiting the legiti
macy of the concept of moral order both spatially and tempo
rally.
Nevertheless, Adams* appointments were confirmed by the
Senate, and the House of Representatives approved the appropri-
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tions. As it turned out, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The Con
gress of Panama emerged as a sounding board for the anti-Ameri
can propaganda dispensed by Canning*s agent there, Edward J.
Dawkins, and the American plenipotentiaries did not arrive in
Panama until the Congress had adjourned, for the long Congres271
sional debate had delayed their departure. Dawkins therefore
had an unimpeded opportunity to emphasize that Britain had
refused to join the United States in advising Mexico and Colom
bia not to invade Cuba, for example, and by this and other
statements, to put the United States in the worst possible
light, and to concomitantly enhance British prestige in Latin
27
America. British naval and commercial superiority did the rest.
Consequently, the Lockean relationship between idea and action
was never more clearly— and negatively— shown. According to
Locke, morality is the relationship of actions with rules of
273
moral good. Therefore, morality must be actively promulgated.
In order to be effected, principle cannot remain in an in vitro
state. Nevertheless, Adams* caution and regard for Constitu
tional law remained the rule in American policy throughout his
27^
administration. There would be a Lockean balance between the
moral and the pragmatic, and a dependence upon a humane law of
nations, regardless of whether the idea and practice of it
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could be successfully projected overseas.
John Quincy Adams, therefore, epitomized the moralistic
and the pragmatic confluence of Lockean belief and action in
his diplomatic career. Particularly relevant to his actions,
and revealing a remarkable similarity to his own beliefs, were
the concepts of Locke which involved moral order, the self,
property, knowledge and thought. He synthesized these ideas,
either deriving them from Locke, or developing them in a
remarkable instance of parallel thought, into a powerful basis
for action as a diplomat. They comprised, in effect, a uni
verse of interpenetrating thought and action through which
Adams was able to effect the empirical, and by that realize a
large measure of self-definition and freedom, despite an often
unsympathetic reality populated by politicians, diplomats, and
others, both American and European.
Later, the Presidential administration of John Quincy
Adams was, in foreign affairs, a function of his will. Again,
it was a will which was at once both moralistic and pragmatic.
On an even larger canvas he synthesized this into a mixed mode
conceptualization which was used in formulating and effecting
policies in regard to Great Britain, France, Greece, and the
Latin American republics. Its Lockean corollaries involved the
maintainance of that concept of self, whether defined by a
continuing consciousness? thought and action? or knowledge,
particularly moral knowledge. Intimately related to this was
perhaps the supreme Lockean idea which John Quincy Adams
embraced— the concept of the state as a condition of moral
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order. With this, he was able to universalize and render corpo
rate the Lockean synthesis and to apply it in a way which was
consistent with both theoretical and practical considerations
in regard to foreign policy.
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